Eastern Kentucky University

Encompass
Justice Studies Faculty and Staff Research

Justice Studies

1-1-1997

Governmental Corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a Case Study
Gary W. Potter
Eastern Kentucky University, gary.potter@eku.edu

Bankole Thompson
Eastern Kentucky University

Follow this and additional works at: https://encompass.eku.edu/cjps_fsresearch
Part of the Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Potter, Gary W. and Thompson, Bankole, "Governmental Corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a Case
Study" (1997). Justice Studies Faculty and Staff Research. 4.
https://encompass.eku.edu/cjps_fsresearch/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Justice Studies at Encompass. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Justice Studies Faculty and Staff Research by an authorized administrator of Encompass. For more
information, please contact Linda.Sizemore@eku.edu.

Crime, Law & Social Change 28: 137–154, 1997.
c 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

137

Governmental corruption in Africa: Sierra Leone as a case study
A criminal justice perspective

BANKOLE THOMPSON & GARY POTTER
Eastern Kentucky University, College of Law Enforcement, Department of Police Studies,
Richmond, KY, USA

Abstract. This paper examines the definition and context of official corruption in the emerging
African nation of Sierra Leone. Historical, legal and sociological studies of the development
of Sierra Leone and corruption within that nation are reviewed, as well as the content of
official judicial inquiries into administrative corruption. These investigations and studies are
supplemented with data from the primary author’s experiences as a prosecutor and judge in
Sierra Leone. Predisposing factors which facilitate corruption are identified and a variety of
policies aimed at reform are discussed.

Governmental corruption in Sierra Leone conceptualized
Analyzing the phenomenon of governmental corruption in Sierra Leone,
Kpundeh recently noted that nation has “endured a pattern of corruption
remarkable in its depth and extent” (1993). Conceptualizing governmental
corruption in any society is a formidable task rendered complicated by its
amorphous and complex nature. It seems to defy definition mainly because
of the inexhaustiveness of its categories as can be deduced from a document
jointly prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and
the African Association for Public Administration and Management, defining “unethical behavior” at the governmental level as encompassing: bribery,
corruption, abuse of office, patronage, nepotism, conflict of interest, influence
peddling, using of official position for personal pleasure, favors to relatives
and friends, divided loyalty, slowness, late-coming, partiality, partisanship,
absenteeism, insubordination, misuse of government property, leaking or misusing government information and “engaging in any unsanctioned activity”
(1992). Corruption can also be characterized as the intentional noncompliance with the principle that personal or family relationships ought not to play
a role in economic decisions by private agents or government officials (Tanzi,
1996). Due to its diverse, grotesque and subtle manifestations, governmental
corruption in third world countries cannot be explained in terms of a single
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theory as to its predisposing factors. Hence, the quest in this article for a
plurality of causes.
In the context of the Sierra Leone experience, governmental corruption
may be defined as “behavior of public officials which deviates from accepted
norms in order to serve private ends” (Huntington, 1990). Based on this conceptual framework the authors propose to undertake a preliminary study of
the predisposing factors for this disturbing phenomenon in the African nation
of Sierra Leone. Despite the lack of a consistent and systematic body of study
on governmental corruption in Sierra Leone, it is common knowledge that
it is prevalent in that country. All the empirical indicators point overwhelmingly to this conclusion. Four key sources of data will be the basis of this
preliminary study. First, historical, sociological, political and legal studies
about the country will be relied upon. Second, the only known sociological
study on administrative corruption will be examined. Third, the findings of
Judicial Commissions of Inquiry into governmental corruption will be noted.
Fourth, the primary author’s official interpretations of empirical indicators on
the subject of corruption in the public service during his tenure of office in the
1970s and 1980s in Sierra Leone, first, as State Attorney and second, Judge
of the High Court respectively will be offered.
Sierra Leone’s political economy
To explore the roots and understand the dynamics of governmental corruption
in Sierra Leone, it is necessary to provide a brief profile of the country’s
political economy. Sierra Leone’s political evolution during the first thirtythree years of independence was dominated variously by the practice of
some measure of multi-party democracy, “the overthrow of constitutional
governments, supersession of pre-existing constitutions, the setting up of
arbitrary military and civilian regimes, and a carefully orchestrated transition
from constitutional monarchy in 1971 to executive presidency with a potential
for the concentration of power in a single institution climaxed in 1978 by the
adoption and entrenchment of a one-party system of government” (Thompson,
1997). Forebodingly, it was during the fourteen years of one-party rule in that
country that governmental corruption was most rampant and that it reached
peak levels. Presently, a civilian government pledged to eradicating corruption
is in power following multi-party elections in 1996.
Sierra Leone has had a checkered socio-economic history. In the nascent
years of its independence (the 1960’s) the country exhibited the profile of
an open developing economy with three-fourths of the population relying for
its livelihood on crop production largely for subsistence and at low levels
of productivity. Use of money was low in comparison with other developing economies with comparable per capita income. Indigenization has not
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been a feature of Sierra Leone’s modern economy. Mining, a small modern manufacturing sector, and organized trade are largely foreign dominated.
In 1969 primary production of unprocessed crude materials – minerals and
crops – occupied 80 percent of the active population, furnished 90 percent of
export earnings, and accounted directly for more than 50 percent of the gross
domestic product. The money economy was strongly dependent on foreign
trade (Kaplan et al., 1976). In the mid 1970s it seemed as if the country’s
economic performance might improve. Sierra Leone embarked on its first
comprehensive development plan under generally favorable conditions. But
there were some major drawbacks: diamond earnings, its main source of
foreign exchange, were on the decline, and iron ore mining which had been
second in importance, had ceased altogether. Another serious drawback was
of an external nature. It was the exacerbating effect of world wide inflation
on the imbalance in external trade and payments generated by (1) rising consumption and (2) government deficit spending. In addition, recession in the
industrial countries had depressed export prices and threatened to slow down
the foreign investment needed to revive the crucial mining sector (Kaplan et
al., 1976). As the country entered the 1980’s, the profile was one of severe
economic retrogression and decline. There were recurrent over-expenditure
by the government, widespread illicit mining of diamonds, continuing foreign ownership of mining companies engaged in the production of bauxite,
rutile, and iron ore, decline in agricultural production, shortage of essential
foodstuffs, a marked rise in imported goods, escalation of prices of basic
necessities, and massive international indebtedness. These trends continued
into the 1990’s with the attendant lowering of the morale in the labor force
whose wages declined in terms of purchasing power. There was also a severe
depression in the living standards of the population until a military junta overthrew the civilian government in April 1992 alleging widespread corruption,
financial malpractices and indiscipline in the public service. The majority of
Sierra Leoneans today continue to live below the subsistence level. These
have been ominous trends for a nation with only a population of 3.7 million
and an area of 27,925 square miles and tremendous potential for agricultural development and economic prosperity. The country is endowed with rich
natural and mineral resources and much human expertise. Present indications
are that there has just begun a massive socioeconomic reconstruction process
in the country following the restoration of civilian rule. It is hoped that the
results of this process will be positive.
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Modernization as a primary predisposing factor for governmental
corruption in Sierra Leone
As a nation, Sierra Leone began its transition from a traditional society to a
modern state with the advent of colonialism. Established as a colony and protectorate of the British Crown in 1808 and 1896 respectively it remained under
British colonial tutelage until April 27, 1961 when it became an independent
sovereign nation. At independence the country possessed some of the key
infrastructural features associated with a modern state: a modern economic
structure, a constitutional system of western orientation, a legal system largely patterned after the English common law tradition, an educational system
essentially of British orientation, a public service modeled after the public
service in England, and national defense and internal security institution organized along modern lines. But alongside this image of modernity were the
forces of traditionalism embedded in the country’s social system. Up till the
present time, there has not yet emerged for the majority of Sierra Leoneans
the idea of a national society. No single social structure has yet evolved that
encompasses all Sierra Leoneans. The law has failed to provide the needed
impetus for such a desirable and positive change.
Sierra Leone’s culture is heterogeneous, the major cultural division being
between the Creoles (or Krios) and the indigenous peoples belonging to
diverse cultural groups. The legal effect of this cultural differentiation is that
Sierra Leoneans are either “natives” or “non-natives”. A “native” is a citizen
of Sierra Leone who is a member of a race, tribe, or community settled in
Sierra Leone (or the territories adjacent thereto), other than a race, tribe or
community (a) which is of European or Asiatic or American origin, (b) whose
principal place of settlement is the Western Area. The term “non-native” is
used to designate association with long residence and property interests in
the Western Area; some consanguineous of affinal tie with established Krio
or Creole families; affiliation with Christianity and Western education; and
the practice of monogamous statutory marriage (Harrel-Bond and Rijinsdrop,
1974; Thompson, 1996). At the time of this writing, nothing has been done
to reform this aspect of the law.
Sierra Leone’s blend of cultures and historical background have enormous
implications for the process of modernization reflecting, in a significant way,
the underlying tension between both the phenomena of traditionalism and
modernism. Most Sierra Leoneans still live in a rural environment where
rights, duties, and liabilities are defined mainly by customary norms and
values, and where social conformity and cohesion are emphasized. Primary
loyalty is to the immediate kinship group, and solidarity among kin remains
a foremost social value. Control of behavior is exercised through a sense
of reciprocity that links an individual’s social and emotional rewards with
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fulfillment of his obligations to the group. By contrast, the western-cultured
Krio or Creole community is essentially individualistic, with emphasis being
on personal effort and success. Ties among the immediate family provide
the strongest cohesive factor (Kaplan et al., 1976). Obligations towards one’s
family within the traditional social system do not derive from normative
prescriptions embodied in statute law or common law.
Theorizing about governmental corruption and its empirical dimensions
in Sierra Leone should focus on the element of cultural heterogeneity and
the corresponding clash between modern culture and traditional culture as
predisposing influences. Modernization in Sierra Leone has involved a change
in the basic values of the society. In particular, it has meant, on the one hand, a
gradual acceptance by the various groups within the society of universalistic
and achievement-based norms, the emergence of loyalties and identifications
of individuals and groups within the nation, the spread of the assumption that
Sierra Leoneans have equal rights against the state and equal obligations to the
state, and, on the other, the persistence of culturally-structured norms. This
is an important facet of the shift from a collectively based traditional society
to an urban society with a distinct accent on individualism. In the context of
the ongoing clash between the modernizing influences and traditional culture,
behavior which was acceptable and legitimate according to traditional norms
becomes unacceptable and corrupt when viewed from a modern perspective
(Huntington, 1990). This is particularly noteworthy in societies where family
or other kinds of relationships are very strong and especially where existing
moral or social codes require that one must help one’s family and friends.
The expectation in such cases that the public employee will routinely apply
arms’s-length principles in his or her relations with friends and relatives
is unrealistic (Tanzi, 1995). This is especially true of cultures structured
around the extended family system as opposed to those based on the nuclear
family unit. Since the attainment of independence by Sierra Leone there
has evolved a new norm in traditional culture whereby the status of family
members who acceded to political leadership or became members of the
higher echelon of the public service began to be measured in terms of the
degree of affluence reflected by their lifestyles. And so, a politician or senior
public employee who did not, for example, own a Mercedes-Benz car or other
prestigious automobile was unlikely to be held in high esteem by his relatives
or supporters even though he may be a person of integrity.
Corruption, as a by-product of modernization, often blurs the distinction
between the official roles of public officers and their personal interests. This
becomes extremely complex and troubling when the rationalization is applied
to the office of the President. Where the culture of the society fails to make
a clear demarcation between the role of the Head of State or Government as
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a private person and his or her role as a public figure it may be viewed as an
affront to the integrity of the office to accuse the holder of corruption. In Sierra
Leone, every Head of Government, since independence has been designated
and venerated as “Father of the Nation”, a characterization which confers upon
the office and the holder some measure of patrimonial infallibility rendering
him immune from criticism (Thompson, 1997) or any suggestion of corrupt
or improper conduct (a point to be addressed fully later).
Modernization is a primary predisposing factor for governmental corruption also in the sense that it contributes to the creation of new sources of
wealth and power, the relation of which to politics is undefined by the dominant traditional norms of the society and in which the modern norms are
not yet accepted by the dominant groups within the society. In Sierra Leone,
the rise of the new governing elite after independence was accompanied by a
corresponding creation of new avenues of wealth and power with enormous
possibilities for widespread corruption within the public service over which
they had gained ascendancy. In addition, in emergent democracies modernization invariably leads to the creation of governmental bureaucracies with
an increase in governmentally regulated activities and the potential for massive and rampant corruption. In the 1980’s governmental corruption reached
peak proportions in Sierra Leone with the consolidation of one-party rule
and the evolution of a very powerful and highly centralized party bureaucracy demanding obedience to the pernicious doctrine of personal greed and
unjust enrichment. One implication of this trend was that it put beyond the
pale of official scrutiny the financial malpractices of those who espoused and
practiced such an ideology. Hence the Herculean dimension of governmental
corruption in Sierra Leone during the 1980s and early 1990s.

The extent of governmental corruption in Sierra Leone: Kpundeh’s
study (1994)
Some scholars (e.g. Kpundeh, 1994) have attributed the phenomenon of
administrative corruption in Sierra Leone to lack of political accountability. Highlighting its pervasiveness, Kpundeh observes:
The pervasive nature of corruption in almost every kind of activity, and
the reluctance of the nation’s leaders to systematically fight this widespread malaise, allowed questionable practices to continue and eventually
become an institutionalized way of life for Sierra Leoneans. Consequently, the culture of corruption enabled the governing class to attain economic
domination, and the whole bureaucratic structure was converted into an
instrument of self-endorsement by prominent civil servants (1994).
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This is a grave indictment of the country’s political and administrative institutions and those who wielded power during the period under review. In the past
three decades corruption in Sierra Leone emanated from the executive and
permeated the core of the entire body politic (Thompson, 1997). The doctrine
of patrimonial infallibility, ascribed to every Head of State and Government
by the Sierra Leone populace, precluded the possibility of official review
of their public conduct for improprieties committed while in office, thereby
providing a catalyst for corruption.
In his well-documented study of the attitudes to corruption in Sierra Leone,
Kpundeh found that 55 percent of the 300 respondents selected from various
parts of the country rated corruption as a problem second only in importance
to the rebellion going on in the country at the time. Another key finding
was that 89 percent agreed that bribery was harmful while 74 percent of
those interviewed personally felt a lot of pressure at work to engage in what
they perceived to be corruption. A further finding was that 80 percent agreed
with the suggestion that there are two interpretations of law in Sierra Leone
– one for the rich and one for the poor. The study also showed that 55
percent of those interviewed agreed that politicians were members of the
most corrupt “profession” and that Sierra Leoneans believe politicians are
mainly responsible for their current problems and that they have contributed
significantly to draining the country’s resources for personal gains. One major
finding was that 86 percent of the respondents stated that there was a great
lack of trust in the integrity of government officials and that they were corrupt.
In addition, the study revealed that 80 percent agreed that laws were needed to
ensure that dishonest public officials were judged more harshly than private
citizens (Kpundeh, 1994). These are quite significant findings. They, however,
merely reflect a tip of the iceberg.
Nonetheless, the irresistible inference from Kpundeh’s study is that the
Sierra Leonean populace was victimized to the level of poverty and powerlessness through administrative corruption. In this regard, the courts could not
escape some censure for their contribution to this form of state victimization
of the citizenry (Thompson, 1997) in the sense that “of all the manifold causes of Third World poverty and powerlessness, the organized polity can most
readily manipulate the law” rendering the law a part of the problem rather than
a part of the solution (Seidman, 1992). Predicated upon this reasoning, it may
be instructive to provide an overview of law and justice in Sierra Leone in so
far as their ineffectiveness may be said to account, in part, for governmental
corruption in the country.
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Law and justice response to governmental corruption: judicial findings
(1993)
As presently organized, the Sierra Leone courts are incapable of controlling
governmental corruption. By parity of reasoning, the law, too, will continue
to be powerless in this regard in the absence of major substantive and procedural reforms. Whenever the courts have acted to combat governmental
corruption in Sierra Leone, it has invariably been inquisitorially and ex post
facto. A most recent effort in this direction was when the military took over
the government on April 29, 1992. Convinced that administrative corruption
had been widespread, the military authorities thought it expedient to institute
some machinery whereby accountability on the part of public officials for
“corruption, mismanagement, and indiscipline in the affairs of government”
during 1968–1992 could be established. To this end, three judicial Commissions of Inquiry presided over by judges of the Superior Court of Judicature
were set up. Their mandate was mainly to examine the assets, activities and
related matters of all persons who were Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Ministers
and Deputy Ministers during the period under review to determine whether
allegations of corruption, dishonesty, abuse of power for private benefit and
financial losses to government occasioned by their conduct could be established (Public Notice No. 172, 1993).
Instructively, the main Commission found, inter alia, that during his tenure
of office, as Prime Minister and then President of Sierra Leone, Siaka Stevens
acquired a sizeable amount of assets (personal and real properties) grossly in
excess of his personal emoluments between March 1968 (when he assumed
the office as Prime Minister) and November 1986 when he retired from office
as President. In addition, it was found that during his tenure of office as
President he had acquired, besides a large number of real properties, a fleet
of 23 vehicles and huge cash deposits in various banks in Sierra Leone and
overseas far beyond his total income in the form of emoluments and traveling
allowances paid to him while in office (Report, 1993; Thompson, 1997). Further, the Commission found that several cabinet ministers in the All Peoples’
Congress (APC) government had acquired substantial amounts of personal
and real properties during the periods they held ministerial offices. It was
noted specifically in respect of most of them that they had maintained standards of living incommensurate with their past official emoluments and were
in control of pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to their past
official emoluments. As if to underscore the magnitude of the permeation of
corruption into other key agencies of the executive branch, namely, the Police
and the Armed Forces, there was evidence that the Force Commander and
Inspector General of Police had maintained standards of living far in excess
of their incomes as Ministers of State in the APC government. The latter was
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found to have possessed huge questionable assets. There was also evidence
that huge sums of money were paid into several banks in his name by anonymous persons, and that “he did maintain a standard of living incommensurate
with his past official emolument” (Report, 1993; Thompson, 1997).
The Commission also found, in relation to another group of key public officials, that they too had “maintained a standard of living which was
incommensurate with their past emoluments” or “were in control of pecuniary resources and property disproportionate to their past emoluments” or
“abused their offices for their private benefit”, or “acted willfully and corruptly in such a manner as to cause financial loss to Government” (Report,
1993; Thompson, 1997). The two other Commissions made similar findings
on the part of named public officials and government ministries, departments
and agencies resulting in huge financial losses to the Government (Reports,
1993; Thompson, 1997).

Judicial inquisition as a technique of public accountability:
questionable efficacy
As a technique of public accountability, the inquisitorial role of the Sierra
Leone judiciary, performed through the instrumentality of Commissions of
Inquiry, proved somewhat effective in unearthing massive administrative corruption in the country. The courts made appropriate forfeiture of assets and
restriction orders. But this was only ex post facto. Against the background of
actual massive administrative corruption and the potential for such conduct as
Sierra Leone treads once more warily the delicate path towards establishing a
stable and viable democracy, it is unsatisfactory for law and justice, as instrumentalities for handling governmental corruption, to be applied only ex post
facto. The problem here is accentuated by the fact that, unlike most western
countries, Sierra Leone has to contend with a dual legal system and a plurality
of laws, a colonial legacy. This poses a major challenge to the new nations in
their legal fields, namely, that of reconciling contradictions in their laws and
cultures (Thompson, 1996a). It is a problem that Sierra Leone, as a developing
nation, needs to resolve in that the control of governmental corruption can be
said to be one area where its disparate impact is evident. In addition, it does
have serious implications for the capability of the criminal justice system in
dealing with the problem. Sierra Leone criminal law derives from two key
sources: customary law and general law which includes the inherited English
law. Even though not entirely codified, the substantive criminal law of Sierra
Leone is found mainly in statutes inherited from English criminal law and
statutes enacted by the Sierra Leone legislature; in contrast, the customary
law of crime is wholly uncodified. This means that whereas, under general
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law, there are laws (both statutory and common law) defining specific criminal offenses there are no comparable customary law definitions of what acts
constitute crimes. Therefore, the question what are crimes under customary
law cannot be answered with any degree of certainty and specificity. Each
body of criminal law has its own distinct underlying value system. This is
a consequence of the broader conflict between the process of modernizing
influences and the traditional culture.
The legal system of Sierra Leone, accordingly, depicts a machinery of justice whose general law values defining the context of criminality are somewhat
at variance with those underlying customary law values as to what is or is
not socially acceptable or ethical. The British oriented general law normative
scheme continues to be superimposed on a traditionally-based social system
rooted in native law and custom. The society, therefore, portrays glaring contradictions in moral and social values embedded in the customary law system
in relation to those inherited from the common law tradition even though
there is some conscious or unconscious aspiration towards the cultivation of
western values (Thompson, 1996a) on the part of significant segments of the
population.
Based on this analysis, definitions of concepts like criminality, deviance,
corruption, unethical behavior, conflict of interest, abuse of office, patronage
and nepotism based on western conceptualizations and intended to apply to
cultural or socio-political settings of different orientations ineluctably lead
to anomalies and contradictions in societies where the socio-cultural norms
and values of the majority are largely non-western. Where there is cultural
conflict in a society and the legal norms of one cultural group are extended to
cover the territory of another and the cultural concepts foreign to that group
are expected to guide the behavior of group members, the result is some mode
of adjustment to the conflict (Sellin, 1983). In Sierra Leone, this adjustment
has been imperceptibly slow. In the absence of significant advance in this
direction, this cultural dichotomy is likely to create a greater scope and newer
channels for the continuing exploitation and victimization of the citizenry
through governmental deviance with the potential for further erosion of the
national fabric of a developing African country now committed to economic
progress and development within a pluralistic democratic framework.
It is ironic, however, that a justice system (as Sierra Leone’s) so elaborate in
organization and sophisticated in application can be so ineffective in combating administrative criminality and deviance of the magnitude that prevailed
in the country. Perhaps, an overview of the court system is appropriate at this
stage. The country has a dual court system. There are the general law courts
and the local or customary law courts. The judicial system is a five-layered
hierarchical structure. At the general law level, the general law courts operate
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over the entire territory of Sierra Leone transcending cultural boundaries. The
highest court is the Supreme Court, exercising generally appellate jurisdiction
in civil and criminal matters. Exceptionally, it has original jurisdiction with
regard to: (a) the interpretation and enforcement of the constitution and (b)
alleged violations of fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. At
the intermediate level is the Court of Appeal. Its function is exclusively to
review decisions of the High Court in civil and criminal matters. Next is the
High Court, whose jurisdiction is extensive and covers original, appellate and
supervisory powers. Its original jurisdiction is coextensive with that of the
U.S. District Courts, the Courts of general jurisdiction at the state level in the
U.S., and that of the High Court of Justice in England. The High Court also
reviews decisions of magistrates’ courts, the lowest adjudicatory bodies in
the hierarchy of the general law courts. Magistrates’ courts hear and dispose
of minor civil and criminal cases within their specific political boundaries.
At the local courts level, the Court of Appeal reviews decisions of the High
Court, given in either the latter’s original, appellate, or supervisory capacities.
The Court of Appeal’s decisions are reviewed by the Supreme Court. Below
the Court of Appeal, the Local Appeals Division of the High Court reviews
decision of the District Appeal Court (a magistrates’ court with two experts
in customary law sitting in an appellate capacity and reviewing decisions
emanating from the local or customary law courts, the lowest bodies in the
customary system). The original jurisdiction of the High Court, as a general
law tribunal, extends to all disputes affecting all segments of the country’s
population which means that every person resident in Sierra Leone has to
conform his/her conduct to the proscriptive requirements of the general law
– with the exception of matters exclusively regulated by customary law. The
local courts in Sierra Leone adjudicate, on the civil side, family matters and
local land disputes. Significantly, too, they hear and dispose of minor criminal
cases per se and charges of a criminal nature arising out of domestic and local
land disputes, if within the scope of their jurisdiction (Thompson, 1996a).
The ordinary courts seem ill-equipped to control administrative corruption.

Law enforcement problems as predisposing factors for governmental
corruption
The judiciary aside, law enforcement problems, too generate opportunities for
administrative deviance in Sierra Leone. Some of these problems are, in part, a
legacy of colonialism. To understand this aspect, a brief analysis is necessary
of the role of the police within the contemporary setting of Sierra Leone
society. No meaningful account of African policing in a modern perspective
can be complete without some historical insights into the evolution of policing
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in Africa. This is true of Sierra Leone. The police in Sierra Leone, like most
of their African counterparts, are a product of colonial rule. Contrary to
the myth that British colonial legacies of policing in Africa were faithful
models of the British paradigm, the Sierra Leone police force, as a colonial
institution, was designed to serve and promote British imperialistic interests,
of which profit was a key feature. Nor was the advent of independence matched
by a transition in Sierra Leone from the colonial policing mentality to one
guided by the principles and values of liberal democracy, with appropriate
institutional safeguards in relation to the police against conduct amounting to
conflict of interests, corruption, abuse of power, favoritism, nepotism or other
improper activity not sanctioned by law. Hence, the extremely corrupt nature
of the Sierra Leone Police Force, itself a dimension of the culture of corruption
that thwarted the country’s post-independence political and economic growth.
The judicial finding (1993) that the holder of the office of Inspector General
of Police from 1978 to 1992 maintained a standard of living far in excess
of his income underscores the contention being made that the police were
institutionally corrupt.
Other law enforcement constraints which consitute predisposing factors for
governmental corruption in Sierra Leone are both resource-related and structural in character. Despite lack of specific supporting empirical evidence,
during the period of one-party rule the police especially at the rank and file
level, frequently abused their powers of arrest, search and seizure and invariably solicited and accepted bribes or other favors from crime suspects or
from agents or relatives in exchange for leniency in enforcing the law. They
also executed their duties in a manner that showed strong political biases and
other extraneous influences (Thompson, 1996a). These shortcomings were
largely attributable to: (1) very low educational level, (2) lack of professional standards and ethics, (3) very low wages, and (4) extremely low morale
(Thompson, 1996a). In addition, there was the nagging problem of the politicization of the police, a factor of their relationship with the ruling elite, the
chief perpetrators of administrative improprieties.
In many African countries (Sierra Leone being a clear example) the police
are inextricably intertwined with the political system. A distinct effect of
this has been a marked tendency towards the formation of strong affinities between them and the powerful political and economic groups in those
countries. A negative effect of this development is that some high-ranking
African police officers enjoy enormous political leverage derived from partisan patronage. Such relationships have always been predisposing influences
for corruption. During the period of one-party rule the Inspector General
of Sierra Leone exerted considerable political leverage in ways that sometimes not only endangered the fair and objective enforcement of the law
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but also generated an environment conducive to corruption within the police
establishment. Besides the law enforcement dimension of corruption in the
country, certain crimes committed within and against the bureaucracies in
Sierra Leone were themselves evidence of corrupt activities in government
departments and ministries.
White-collar crime as a species of administrative corruption
Even though it is difficult to construct an accurate crime profile for Sierra
Leone due largely to the lack of reliable means of measuring the amount of
crime in that developing African nation, it is strongly surmised that since independence crime rates have continued to escalate in the country. Apart from
the rise in conventional or street crimes, it is true that white collar, corporate
and economic criminality predominate in Sierra Leone. “White-collar crime”
here refers to offenses committed by individuals for self-enrichment in the
course of their occupations and to offenses of employees against their employers. In this sense, the term is used synonymously with “occupational crime”
(Hagan, 1987); “corporate crime”, on the other hand, consists of offenses by
the corporation itself; and “economic crime” refers to any non-violent, illegal
activity which principally involves deceit, misrepresentation, concealment,
manipulation, breach of trust, subterfuge, or illegal circumvention (Clifford,
1977). The empirical indicators show that white collar crimes in Sierra Leone
became dominant in the 1960s, escalated in the 1970s and reached crisis
proportions in the 1980s (Thompson, 1996a). However, defined, white collar, corporate and economic crimes can correctly be perceived as species of
corruption depending on the facts and circumstances.
Specifically, over the last two decades there was a marked rise in Sierra
Leone in crimes committed within and against the bureaucracies. Such crimes
have had detrimental effects on allocation and utilization of public resources,
derived from both internal and external sources; and on the nation’s socioeconomic development particularly in relation to agriculture, housing, trade,
health, education and similar projects. In the recent past, such funds have
been embezzled practically into non-existence. These brands of criminality
assumed epidemic proportions in the 1970s and 1980s culminating in the
unearthing by the police of a huge fraud conspiracy within the civil service,
later described as the “Vouchergate Fraud Cases” (over which the primary
author presided as trial judge) (Thompson, 1996b). Subsequent to that was a
similar fraud conspiracy known as the “Milliongate Fraud Case”.
Under Sierra Leone criminal law, white collar, corporate and economic
crimes may take various forms: larceny by servant, embezzlement, conspiracy
to defraud, falsification of accounts, forgery, fraudulent conversion, obtain-
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ing money or property by false pretenses, corporate fraud, receiving stolen
property, smuggling of diamonds, failure to pay income tax, and evasion or
waiver of customs import duties. The penalties for these offenses vary considerably depending on the amount of pecuniary or property loss involved
and whether the particular offense is a misdemeanor or felony. Significantly, there is presently no jurisdiction in the ordinary courts of Sierra Leone,
in the exercise of their criminal jurisdiction, to make forfeiture of assets or
restitution orders in addition to the imposition of criminal sanctions. Their
powers to impose fines are limited by statutory maximum. This issue will be
addressed in the subsequent section of the article in the context of possible
law and justice reforms.
Further analysis and conclusion
Consistent with the underlying theme of this article that multiple predisposing factors rather than a single theory adequately explain the phenomenon of
governmental corruption in Africa, Riley cautions against generalizing that
corruption is “an outgrowth of African culture” (1993). He offers this classification of governmental corruption in Africa: incidental corruption, systematic
corruption, systemic corruption, and personal corruption involving key political figures (1993).
Applying the above classification to Sierra Leone it can be shown that:
incidental corruption is exemplified by a public employee in the course of
duty who solicits a bribe or favor on a quid pro quo basis; systematic corruption is illustrated by government ministries or departments engaging in
fraudulent activities with consequential financial losses to the government,
which activities themselves may amount to criminal wrongdoings, like conspiracy to defraud, falsification of accounts, and embezzlement; systemic
corruption characterizes the widespread and pervasive pattern of wrongdoing
transformed into the norm for achieving societal goals and objectives (Caiden
and Caiden, 1977); and personal corruption at the level of key political figures finds its most classic application in the blurring of the personal and
official roles of the chief executive especially in relation to the utilization and
disbursement of government funds designed for national development. The
cumulative effect of these trends is the elevation of dishonesty to the level of
a new superior norm and the corresponding deprecation of honesty.
In Sierra Leone a strikingly negative feature of the All Peoples Congress
administration was the belief (frequently alluded to by the President) that
“Da sae wey den tie cow, nar dey e go eat grass” meaning literally that
“A cow will graze on land allotted to it for that purpose”. In its extended
sense, the meaning translates into an injunction to public servants to seize
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the opportunity to maximize personal profit or gain at any cost while the
opportunity lasted because opportunity lost cannot be regained. Never before
in the history of Sierra Leone has the Head of Government been known to be
so overtly supportive of governmental corruption. This, in part, accounted for
the unprecedented deterioration of Sierra Leone’s economy during APC rule.
Apart from its deleterious effect on the quality of life of the majority
of Sierra Leoneans, governmental corruption devastated the country’s economy. The country’s reliance on the export of unrefined mineral products,
mainly, alluvial diamond gems, iron ore, bauxite and agricultural produce
such as coffee and cocoa has already been noted. Some of these commodities,
notably diamonds, have a high susceptibility of being smuggled abroad. Riley
found substantial illicit mining in and smuggling of diamonds from Sierra
Leone since the 1950s (1993). Ironically, this negative impact of governmental corruption on the country’s economy was given added impetus by the
subsequent ambivalence of the political leadership on the issue of corruption:
the President frequently reprobated and approbated the doctrine of personal aggrandizement and unjust self enrichment practiced by numerous public
employees. In addition, income tax evasion by unscrupulous businessmen
aided and abetted by corrupt public officials and the misuse of their authority,
on the part of customs officers, in waiving or reducing customs import duties
were major contributory factors to the economy’s decline during the several years of APC rule. The primary author actually prosecuted a major case
involving conspiracy to defraud as a result of a fraudulent waiver of customs
import duty resulting in serious financial losses to the government. It is a fair
assumption, therefore, that the level of such activities was very high indeed
in the 1970s and 1980s.
Governmental corruption in Africa also emanates from defective administration. Sierra Leone is a clear case in point. The World Bank has shed
some light on this dimension of the problem by observing that “pervasive or
systematic corruption is a symptom of poor governance” (1991). Charlick put
the issue squarely in these terms:
While corruption is manifest in every society, and in democratic as well as
authoritarian regimes, systematic corruption is a deadly sign that a society
can no longer effectively manage its resources for public purposes (1993).
Kpundeh’s study and the findings of the Judicial Commissions show conclusively that during the period 1971–1992 those who were in authority in
Sierra Leone failed to manage the country’s resources effectively for public
purposes. Government funds were appropriated by the governing elite and
their supporters for personal gain and profit at the expense of the majority
of the population. Where there are no adequate institutional safeguards to
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buttress democratic governance and public accountability the result is that
the predisposing factors for governmental corruption are more likely to be
greater than minimal.
Combating governmental corruption anywhere is a formidable task. In the
African Region concern for the problem has been expressed by the African
Bureau of A.I.D. The Bureau has proposed the practice of “democratic governance” as one possible solution. This approach emphasizes “accountability
through open and competitive choice processes, adherence to a standard of
integrity of life which limits most flagrant abuses of power and the most egregious costs of opposition, and the notion of sharing power in public policy
through the recognition of a legitimate role for plural actors. The underlying
assumption here is that efforts to foster “democratic governance” should help
address the problem of systematic corruption (African Bureau of AID, 1992;
see also Charlick, 1993). Sierra Leone has once again embarked on a process
of democratic transformation after the country’s return to political pluralism
in 1995. The country more than ever faces the challenge of democratic governance reinforced by effective institutional mechanisms designed to create
public accountability and ensure high standards of integrity in public service.
Are there in place such institutional safeguards? There is some positive evidence in this direction: the existing constitution (1991) makes provision for
a new extrajudicial machinery – the Ombudsman. Internationally acknowledged as an effective device for curbing governmental abuse of power resulting in human rights’ violations, this Scandinavian institutional model can be
a useful technique of public accountability available to developing nations in
combating administrative corruption. It is estimated that Ombudsman offices
at various levels of government now exist in more than forty countries on
most continents (Owen, 1990; Thompson, 1992). The 1991 Sierra Leone
Constitution confers upon the Ombudsman powers wide enough to cover
investigations of governmental corruption. A jurisdiction of this nature can
effectively supplement the authority of the ordinary criminal courts in punishing, for example, conspiracies to defraud. In addition, there is a pressing need
for a fundamental restructuring of the civil service, as suggested by Olowu
(1993), focusing primarily on the creation of a zone of political indifference
and neutrality on the part of the civil service in relation to the political leadership and other levels of government, and of a strict regime of conduct for
public officials.
Without some major redesigning of the justice process and key substantive
and procedural reforms in the law, it is extremely doubtful whether the ordinary courts, as presently organized, can respond effectively in the foreseeable
future to administrative corruption. A major procedural reform, it is suggested, is to grant the criminal courts an unambiguous jurisdiction – which they
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do not presently have – to confiscate proceeds of certain types of crime where
it is established that those who perpetuate such acts have damaged the moral
fabric of society. The rationale behind such a power is threefold:
1) that such crimes are highly sophisticated, diverse and rampant,
2) they tend to drain the country’s economy of much needed revenue, and
3) the perpetrators should, in principle, not be allowed to retain and benefit
from any portion of their ill-gotten gains.
Forfeiture is a remedy of great antiquity in the law. It has always played
a significant role in the struggle against corruption and criminality of huge
dimensions involving the violation of proprietary interests. Admittedly, the
granting of a forfeiture jurisdiction to the criminal courts will raise a constitutional law question of substantial importance. Most African countries
are governed by written constitutions with enshrined fundamental rights and
freedoms’ provisions, among which are protection for privacy of the home
and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation.
Without carefully crafted saving clauses, a forfeiture jurisdiction many be
held to be inconsistent with such protections or even unconstitutional. Two
positive effects that such a jurisdiction would have are: (1) making the courts
a possible deterrent to administrative deviance and fraud and (2) equipping
them for dispensing not merely legalistic justice (as they presently do) but, in
addition, social justice, that is, justice which aims at eliminating from society
all forms of inequalities, inequities, improprieties, and injustices.
Governmental corruption, in its most morbid sense, can be perceived as “a
viral pathology which is highly contagious, debilitating and costly” (Caiden,
1993). Hence to cultivate a culture of public accountability as a countervailing
force against it, it is necessary, in addition to the deployment of the resources
of the Ombudsman institution, to incorporate in the Constitution (as the
supreme law of the land), a Code of Conduct for Public Officers. This was
one of the merits of the 1993 Draft Constitution of Sierra Leone. It provided
for such a Code. It concerned mainly issues of conflict of interest and abuse
of power. The wisdom of incorporating it in the Draft Constitution stemmed
from an explicit acknowledgement that governmental corruption has been the
single most dominant and debilitating factor affecting the body politic of that
country since independence. Significantly, too, the Law Reform Commission
of Sierra Leone needs to be preoccupied with some major law reform projects
involving economic and trade legislation which presently lend themselves to
either being circumvented or exploited for corrupt and fraudulent purposes,
notably, income tax laws, customs laws, import license laws, and investment
incentives laws.
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